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ABSTRACT 
 
Conflict Monitoring is a crucial exercise in peace building. It is often designed to detect early warning 
signs of potential intra/interpersonal, intra/inter-organisational and other forms of conflict. Monitoring 
and Evaluation should be a major component of any development process. However, in many coun-
tries of the Sahel region this crucial component of development is neglected in their border regions. 
The issue is not a dearth of national policy/ies on Monitoring and Evaluation but that of the political will 
of governments to enforce the implementation of such policies. The extrapolation of evaluation   poli-
cies into constructive actions germane to development often suffers governmental neglect. This paper 
presents the report of the strategies deployed in conflict monitoring and risk evaluation of the Seme 
Border of Nigeria and the Republic of Benin, with a view to enhancing full understanding of the risks 
inherent in security operations at the border, designing a pro-active agenda in the areas of profiling, 
targeting and selecting as preventive diplomacy against further degeneration of activities in the area 
and resultant threat to the security of both countries.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The belief in the peace building and devel-
opment world is that a well monitored rela-
tionship or process can beat the potentials 
of violent conflict. In organisations and 
government agencies conflict monitoring is 
captured under risk assessment in which an 
evaluation of the performance of the agency 
is conducted to detect the threats and other 
factors that may be enhancing or inhibiting 
its performance. Early warning signs should 
provoke appropriate preventive mecha-
nisms and this in turn, would portend a 
congenial atmosphere for development. 
The vulnerability of African borders particu-
larly the Sahel Region with its attendant con-
sequences of violent conflicts and border 
crimes has attracted global attention, which 
spurred many international organisations 
into creating awareness, through trainings 
workshops and seminars in order to arrest 
the spate of this dangerous trend. 
 
In Nigeria, the excuses for this porousity 
have largely been hinged upon dearth of 
trained personnel to man the borders effec-
tively. All the security agencies deployed to 
manage Nigerian borders share this gross 
inadequacy of personnel experience and also 
inadequate funding which culminate in 
poorly equipped workforce. Apart from 
administrative inadequacies like ethnically 
skewed promotion and lack of functional 
health facilities, the workforce is generally 
subjected to dehumanising work environ-
ment, frustration, anger, hopelessness, ha-
tred, illusion, occupational risks and haz-
ards, depression due to poor welfare pack-
ages. The resultant impact of this is low 
productivity and in some extreme cases 
death of the low rank officers- those often 
found in the field. As reported by THIS-
DAY Newspaper of 28th July, 2017, 41 per-
sonnel of NDLEA died in a single year i.e. 
between 2016 and 2017. With a workforce 
of 5001, it means 0.77% personnel were lost 
in a year. Meanwhile there is no assurance 
of their replacement based on the economic 
recession currently placed on the Nigerian 
economy. According to THISDAY: 
This gory situation shows that between 
2016 and middle of 2017, most junior offic-
ers have died. Nine narcotic agents topped 
the list representing 23.68%, followed by 
officers who are Deputy Superintendent of 
narcotic with 18.42% or seven, officers on 
Chief Narcotic Agents (CNA) ranks with 
13.16% or five, Assistant Superintendent of 
Narcotics (ASN) II with 10.53% or four, 
Superintendent of Narcotics (SN) with 
7.89% or four, Senior Narcotic Agent 
(SNA) with 5.26% or two, Narcotic Assis-
tant (NASS) with 5.26% or three, Chief Su-
perintendent of Narcotic (CSN) with 
13.16% or five and finally Assistant Chief 
of Narcotic (CAN) 2.63% or two. 
 
The situation can only slightly differ either 
in the negative or positive way with other 
security agencies charged with the responsi-
bility of manning Nigerian borders. 
This paper focuses on Seme border of Ni-
geria and Republic of Benin given the vari-
ous international brushes the two countries 
have encountered based on trans-border 
crimes which seem intractable by the two 
countries. The border seems to be the most 
active trade route between the West African 
countries and Nigeria and at the same time 
the most virulent source of crime import and 
export. At this juncture this paper would 
take a brief look at the relationship between 
the two countries. 
 
Nigeria-Benin Republic Economic and 
Diplomatic Interactions   
The Nigeria-Dahomey (Benin) boundary was 
arbitrarily taken to lie along longitude 2°
east...and it was intended to be temporary. 
Its function was simply to prevent the terri-
tory falling under the control of another Eu-
ropean country (Afolayan, 2011).  
 
Historically, two Nigerian-based empires had 
ruled over practically the territory of ancient 
Dahomey for about 1,000 years. They are the 
Oyo Empire for the most part of the south 
up to the central peripheries and the Borgu 
Empire in the central region. The Oyo Em-
pire had ruled in the southern and central 
parts of the entity now known as Benin Re-
public since about 11th Century till about 
1889 when the French effectively took over. 
The People's Republic of Benin is a smaller 
country compared to the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, not only in area, but also as shown 
by their population sizes of 4.5 million and 
over 100 million respectively. Benin's popu-
lation is concentrated along the coast. Benin, 
therefore, has a very limited domestic mar-
ket; the country is noted more for being a 
transit corridor for imported goods and local 
farm exports. It serves the land-locked Fran-
cophone countries in its vicinity and its east-
ern neighbour, Nigeria. It also served as a 
warehouse state for Nigeria, especially in the 
1970s when the country experienced periods 
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of port congestion, and during the econom-
ic crises of the 1980s and 1990s. In addi-
tion, Benin has pursued an economic infil-
trations policy towards Nigeria, as a way of 
surviving economically. Its foreign policy 
has invariably been to safeguard its autono-
my by cushioning it from the inevitable 
consequences of any economic malaise in 
Nigeria. 
 
The sharp depreciation of the naira since 
1986 and the growing attractiveness of the 
CFA franc for Nigerian traders are major 
factors that help to explain the regional dy-
namics of the two countries and the high 
level of official and undocumented trade 
between them. When the exchange rate of 
the naira plummeted between 1986 and 
1992, Benin immediately became an inter-
mediary for re-exporting three main prod-
ucts - rice, wheat flour and second-hand 
cars - from Europe into Nigeria. As a result, 
trade boomed in the port of Cotonou be-
tween 1990 and 1993. Also, the devaluation 
of the official rate of the naira encouraged 
the importation of farm inputs from Nige-
ria. Benin also serves as the main intermedi-
ary for other West African Francophone 
countries seeking to buy low-cost Nigerian 
manufactured goods. It benefits from its 
relative closeness to Nigeria and remains a 
major financial market where Nigerians can 
acquire the CFA franc they need for foreign 
trade. 
 
Consequently, trade flourishes along the 
Lagos-Badagry- Cotonou corridor and 
along the Sango-Otta-Idiroko axis on the 
western boundary of Nigeria. The trade in-
volves the movement and sale of imported 
finished goods. The similar cultural charac-
teristics of the people on either side of this 
international boundary facilitate cross-
border trading. 
The ethno-political relations of the two 
countries cannot be ignored as there exists 
historical clannish ties between many 
Beninios and and Nigerian citizens particu-
larly those in the South-Western part of Ni-
geria known as Yoruba. Indeed, it is com-
mon knowledge that an average Beninois 
speaks Yoruba fluently. Obisakin captured 
this succinctly in his remarks: 
 
Recently, the Beninese President had public-
ly declared that 65 per cent of his people are 
of Nigerian origin. One can safely say that 
indeed almost 70 per cent of them are Nige-
ria-related. If the current population of Be-
nin is 10m, this may mean that ethnic Nigeri-
ans in Benin are about 6.5 million. Human 
resources are largely the most crucial factor 
in socio-economic activities in the econo-
mies of the developing countries. This 
should say much about the geo-strategic rela-
tions of the two countries: Nigeria and Be-
nin. 
 
The difficulty in maintaining an effective se-
curity along Nigerian/Benin border posts 
cannot be divorced from the existing social 
relations between the citizens of the two 
countries. Many Nigerians have their kith 
and kin resident in the republic of Benin and 
vice versa. The artificial geographical bound-
ary has not successfully broken the cultural 
ties between them and this fact has inhibited 
control over migration and socio-economic 
interactions between the peoples of the two 
countries. The vast borderline between the 
two countries has also posed a challenge to 
security maintenance in the area. Obisakin is 
alarmed:   
 
How do you police 778 kilometers of creek, 
forest, rivers, lakes, savannah? Will you fence 
them? Obviously, from what I wrote above 
there are certain areas that need careful socio
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-historical and other well researched consid-
erations to tell where the  French colonial 
masters of Benin and the British ones for 
Nigeria demarcated as boundaries between 
these two peoples who were one before the 
1885 artificial boundaries drawn in Berlin.  
The relationship between Nigeria and Benin 
Republic could have passed for cordial but 
for the occasional hiccups that erupt basi-
cally on socio-economic platforms which 
Nigeria considers to be inimical to its 
growth and threatening to its sovereignty. 
Ate & Akinterinwa (2012) succinctly cap-
tured it in the following statement: 
 
The security relations between Nigeria and 
Benin have always centred on two issue are-
as - boundary and military relations. The 
two overlaps. Boundary relations are im-
portant in the first place because of the im-
precision which marked the delimitation 
exercise . . . This setting, is further com-
pounded by the activities of smugglers and 
the actions of overzealous functionaries 
who attempt to enforce legislation beyond 
their areas of jurisdiction . . .Besides bound-
ary relations, political instability especially in 
Benin Republic has been important for their 
security relationship. 
 
In 2003, Nigeria had to resort to counter-
measures to force its position on Benin’s 
violations of the UN principles of friendly 
relations among states. Nigeria closed its 
western borders against Benin Republic to 
press home its demand that that the Beni-
nois government did something decisive 
about the spate of smuggling and other 
trans-border crimes in its territory. Accord-
ing to IRIN news (2003): 
 
For years cars stolen in Nigeria have turned 
up on sale in Benin and large quantities of 
cheap Nigerian petrol have been smuggled 
across the border. At the same time, human 
trafficking has become rife in both direc-
tions. Nigerians seeking clandestine entry to 
Europe often leave via Benin, while West 
African children, recruited to work for low 
wages on plantations in Central Africa are 
dispatched in the opposite direction.  
 
This development arose from the failure of 
the Republic of Benin to exercise control on 
the security lapses in its territory which had 
overlapping consequences on the neighbour-
ing Nigerian state. As was observed (IRIN 
News, 2003), there had been several unavail-
ing entreaties by Nigeria that Republic of 
Benin had to redress its security lapses par-
ticularly on the grounds of trans-border 
crimes: “In the past many complaints were 
made to the Beninois authorities, but failed 
to elicit the appropriate and satisfactory re-
sponse,” the Nigerian foreign ministry said. 
“The decision to close our border with Be-
nin Republic was therefore taken in Nigeria's 
overriding national interest.”  
 
The international relationship with these two 
sister countries can therefore be likened to 
the proverbial ‘cat and mouse’ as far as bor-
der relations are concerned. 
 
Having established the above, this paper 
proceeds to defining the relevant terms to 
the assessment carried out on the Seme bor-
der between Nigeria and the republic of Be-
nin- a procedure closely linked to peace-
building and preventive diplomacy- an early 
warning conflict monitoring exercise. 
 
CONCEPTUAL DISCOURSE 
Conflict Monitoring 
This is a regular and systematic observation, 
collection and collation of information rele-
vant to conflict formation in order to design 
a pro-active action against its escalation. It is 
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an action taken by people concerned with a 
conflict to be kept informed of the dynam-
ics of the conflict. It is about keeping track 
of events in a tense situation and giving an 
objective report on it to a response channel 
or a central authority. It forms the crux of 
the Early Warning System (EWS) that is 
being performed by trained/specialised per-
sonnel who are part of a chain of communi-
cation hub e.g. Civil Society Early Warning 
Monitors for ECOWAS/WANEP 
“ECOWARN” System. Adams (2012) con-
siders Early Warning as a concept that has 
both the global and inter-disciplinary usage 
because of its high quotient for preventive 
diplomacy. To him, it is used in a wide vari-
ety of fields of study to mean the provision 
of first-hand information on a potentially 
volatile action with the aim of instituting 
mechanisms to reduce its intensity or possi-
bly eliminate its potency for violent erup-
tions.  
 
Governance as a system of development is 
inherently a conflict issue, therefore conflict 
monitoring applies to all the aspects of gov-
ernance as they relate to the ruler/ruled re-
lationship. As ‘Conflict-sensitive Monitor-
ing’ engenders a detailed understanding of 
the context, the intervention and the inter-
action between the two, it therefore creates 
a platform for the understanding of under-
lying elements of conflicts such as the ac-
tors, the profile, causes and dynamics of the 
conflict which it introduces into the tradi-
tional evaluation systems and processes 
(WANEP 2005). 
 
An effective Monitoring and Evaluation 
System has two intrinsic components: abil-
ity to examine dispassionately, the correla-
tion between the objectives, input and the 
output of a given project and the capacity 
of relevant agency or government to re-
spond timely to the findings and recommen-
dations of the evaluators-an action contigent 
on the political will mustered by government 
on its implementation.   
 
Basic Intelligence Coverage 
This has been described as the fundamental 
intelligence concerning the general situation, 
resources, capabilities, and vulnerabilities of 
foreign countries or areas which may be used 
as reference material in the planning of oper-
ations at any level and in evaluating subse-
quent information relating to the same sub-
ject (http://www.thefreedictionary.com/
basic+intelligence). 
 
Risk 
Risk is the perceived threat inherent in or 
associated with specific operations. It is a 
combination of threat and vulnerability of 
the person/s of system/s under evaluation 
(Umaru, 2013). While threat is perceived to 
be an external event capable of causing harm 
to ideas, tasks or/and their implementation, 
vulnerability is described as the internal 
weaknesses that might strengthen the impact 
of threat. A vulnerable border territory is a 
threat to the socio-economic existence of the 
two countries and therefore a situation de-
serving monitoring. 
 
Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment is the systematic analysis of 
risk, involving an evaluation of the risks, de-
termination of the level of impact, risk dyna-
mism with a view to designing means of 
tackling the threat. Risk Assessment is a 
Conflict Monitoring tool used in this presen-
tation as a process monitoring organ for ac-
tivities at Seme Border. 
 
Border 
A border is a designated crossing point, 
where formal control is exercised on entry 
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and exit of persons and goods. It is also de-
scribed as ‘a spatial boundary that defines 
sovereignty, citizenship, language, culture or 
religion’ (Pokoo, 2013). It is a boundary 
between political sovereign states. The most 
visible function of a border is to act as a 
barrier and an instrument to be applied for 
controlling illegal immigration human traf-
ficking drugs and weapons and for collect-
ing duties on legal goods (Babatunde, 2013). 
 
Border Management   
Border Management is all the strategies em-
ployed to enhance safe delivery of services 
at the border.  It is about applying official 
rules, regulations, techniques and proce-
dures to regulate activities and traffic within 
specific border zones. It involves the de-
ployment of services of designated person-
nel of relevant security agencies like the 
Custom Services, Immigration Services, The 
Nigeria Police, NDLEA, DSS and Quaran-
tine. 
 
Border Security  
Border Security is the measure of control 
exercised within border areas, which limits 
the movement of people, animals, plants 
and goods that enter and exit the country.   
 
Profiling 
Is an investigative tool that seeks to explore 
and provide understanding of the criminal 
environment in order to be able to control 
it more effectively. 
 
Targeting  
is a method of zeroing in on a few likely 
subjects of enquiry for investigation. These 
subjects are picked based on their conform-
ity to created profile. The number of sub-
jects of target is usually few. 
Selection: This is usually the last stage of 
the exercise where the main culprit or the 
risk is finally determined. Interestingly in 
military intelligence this is the point at which 
arrests are made. In Conflict Monitoring it is 
the point at which the likely trigger of a con-
flict is determined and identified to pave way 
for strategies of preventive diplomacy. 
THE ASSESSMENT    
 
Aim and Objectives: 
The general aim of the project was to con-
duct a risk assessment of Seme Border. The 
following specific objectives therefore ap-
plied to: define border management and oth-
er related concepts; identify all stakeholders 
and their roles in cross-border crimes; inves-
tigate activities which constitute threat at 
Seme Border; prioritise areas of threat and 
vulnerability at the border; develop strategies 
for selecting persons, luggage and vehicles 
profiled as targets at the border;  
 
METHODOLOGY 
(a)  Risk  Assessment Strategies 
The risk assessment strategies employed in-
clude:  
 
Definition of the processes 
Determination of the impact 
Determination of possible causes 
Determination of consequence of risk 
Determination of likelihood of risk 
 Determination of risk rating  
 
(b)  Stakeholders Interviewed: 
The stakeholders included:  
The Customs, Immigration, The Nigeria Po-
lice (Bomb Disposal unit, CIB and Border 
Patrol units), SSS, NDLEA, Clearing Agents, 
Traditional Rulers, Importers, SON, Civil 
Society Organisations, Transport Unions, 
Youth leaders in Border Communities, Mar-
ket Women Association in border communi-
ties, Plant and Animal Quarantine, NAPTIP, 
Press, Port Health,  National Association of 
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Car dealers. 
 
Basic Intelligence Coverage conducted at 
Seme border revealed that there are about 
35 illegal routes around the border area. 
This is an indication of the porosity of the 
border, which in turn precipitates certain 
border risks. 
 
FINDINGS 
The findings of the security risk assessment 
are grouped as follows: 
(a) Identified Risks. 
 
i. Smuggling of vegetable oil, and rice, S 
ii. Smuggling of Small Arms and Light           
      Weapons, 
iii.  Smuggling of vehicles, 
iv.  Route for Human Trafficking, 
v.   Route for Money-Laundering, 
iv.  Trans-border crime e.g armed robber  
vi   Piracy on the Seme sea  
vii. Drug trafficking. 
 
The supports often required from the above
-listed stakeholders are: 
i)        Security Agencies:  
Synergy among border security operatives 
would facilitate intelligence gathering and 
sharing among the security personnel at the 
Seme Border and collaboration for action 
among the security personnel. 
 
ii) Community Leaders and other  
     Interest Groups. 
 
Cooperation with traditional rulers at Seme 
Border communities would generate reliable 
information from members of the commu-
nities and collaboration with them to find 
solution to border crimes.  
 
 
Vulnerabilities- 
Border posts are inadequate to handle the 
influx of people entering and exiting at Seme 
Border: this is as result porosity and too 
many illegal routes which make vehicular 
patrol difficult in such areas. And any un-
manned/unguarded border provides escape 
routes for smugglers. 
Border communities collude with smugglers: 
Unpatriotic attitude on the part of individu-
als/groups residing at border communities 
who often times shield smugglers for their 
selfish gain. 
 
Inadequate capacity of officers/modern 
equipment: in Seme Border the security 
agents are inadequate and there is insuffi-
cient modern equipment to replace the obso-
lete ones at the border post.  
 
Border bureaucracy/rivalry/self-glory 
amongst the security agents inhibits speedy 
service. 
 
Policy Changes often affect Policymaking 
and implementation: different government 
with its own policy affects border operations 
and procedures. 
 
Social insecurity: absence of social insurance 
for the security agencies who lose their lives 
while discharging their official duties. 
 
ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS 
Threats 
Proliferation of SALW 
Increase incidence of trans-border violent 
crimes 
Economic Sabotage / loss of revenue 
Passage of persons of security interest 
Proliferation Hard Drugs 
Violation of human dignity through traffick-
ing and smuggling 
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Priority List: 
1. Drug Trafficking 
2. Small Arms and Light Weapons 
3. Money Laundry 
4. Trans-Border Crimes (e.g. Oil Bun-
kering, Armed Robbery) 
5. Human Smuggling 
6. Food items 
7. Vehicles 
8. Sea piracy 
 
Suggested Risk Handling Strategies: 
High Impact/ Likely to occur: 
 Form Joint Border Operation 
 Place them on red alert 
Low Impact/ Likely to occur: 
 Alert all security agencies 
 Mount Surveillance. 
High Impact/ unlikely to occur: 
 Put security personnel on alert 
Low Impact unlikely to occur: 
 Put security personnel at alert. 
 
AN EXAMPLE OF CRIME TAR-
GETING PLAN: DRUG Trafficking 
Target Crime: Drug Trafficking 
Timing: within 10pm-5am 
Location of crime: West African Countries 
through Seme Border 
Scene of crime: Seme Border,  
Means: Concealment in Vehicles compart-
ment, spare tyres, Body   Package, Conceal-
ment through poultry product.  
The victims of crime and type of harm 
caused:  Victims of Drug Trafficking in-
clude, youths, destitutes, political thugs, area 
boys, religious extremists, armed robbers, 
smugglers, and commercial drivers. Drug 
trafficking aids crime, health hazards, and 
impacts negatively on the nation’s economy 
and its image .   
 
Indicators for Selection:  
Vehicles, Luggages and Persons are the main 
indicators for selection.   
 
PERSON:  
Intelligence report on the person  
Age group  between 18 -30 years 
Response to question 
Body Language 
Emotional display 
Observation 
Monitoring 
 
LUGGAGES:        
Manual Checking of Luggage 
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High impact likely to occur) 
 
(i)      Small Arms and Light Weapons 
(ii)     Drug trafficking 
(iii)    Money Laundry 
(iv)    Trans-Border Crime (e.g illegal Oil  
(v)     Bunkering, Armed Robbery) 
(vi)    Food items 
(vii)   Human Smuggling 
 
Low impact likely to occur 
 
Vehicles 
 
 
 
 
 
High impact unlikely to occur 
 
(i) Human Kidnapping 
  
Low impact unlikely to occur 
 
(i)  Sea piracy 
VEHICLES:            
Intelligence report of the vehicle  
Origin of the vehicle   
Age of the driver 
Destination of the vehicle 
Body Language of the driver 
Travel/Vehicle Documents 
 
CONCLUSION AND  
RECOMMENDATION  
The result of the assessment is quite reveal-
ing as most of the cross-border activities of 
security personnel were revealed, the enor-
mity of border porosity was captured and 
the strategic implements for security risk 
assessment were fully deployed for effective 
evaluation. This report would therefore be 
of immense value to future researchers in 
the area of security risk assessment and also 
a handful tool in the hands of evaluators 
and security personnel. 
 
In view of the global threats and insecurity 
in the Sahel region, it is imperative for the 
entire region to ensure strict compliance 
with existing rules governing border man-
agement to forestall Drug Trafficking, Hu-
man Trafficking and Human Smuggling.  
  
Countries in the Sahel region should invest 
heavily on provision of modern technology 
mounted at all borders area that will detect 
all form illegal importation of SALW. Early 
detection of illegal attempt on importation 
would prevent conflicts arising from prolif-
eration of arms. Less funds would need be 
allocated to arms and ammunition purchase 
to combat these ills if governments’ atten-
tion is diverted to conflict prevention 
through peacebuilding. The funds needed 
for conflict prevention is far less than that 
needed for conflict management, peace-
keeping and conflict transformation.  
Peaceful interaction between countries will 
encourage mutual interest for common 
good. Countries in the Sahel region should 
consider themselves as brothers thereby en-
gendering Joint Border Patrol and Inter-
Border Security meetings necessary for re-
ducing all forms illegal activities at the bor-
der. 
 
Governments, of different countries should 
ensure all the borders are secured through 
fencing. The implication is that, walls will 
effect the barriers which men are currently 
being created by human personnel. The 
dearth of personnel to man international 
boundaries is one of the major causes of 
border porousity. The idea of territorial fenc-
ing is definitely a cost intensive project but it 
will definitely go a long way in curbing the 
menace of territorial incursion and trans-
border crimes.     
  
Institution of a joint conference training cen-
tre would encourage experience sharing and 
common standard practice among the securi-
ty personnel of the two countries. Experi-
ence sharing would boost their technical and 
field performances. 
 
Establishing trans-border security manage-
ment committee would create a cohesive en-
gagement between Nigeria and the Republic 
of Benin with a view to combatting the vari-
ous identified trans-border crimes. 
 
Border security should be an exercise in col-
lective responsibility; all citizens must work 
together to sanitize procedures at the Nigeri-
an Borders to reduce if not eliminate border 
crimes. 
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